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Abstract   
This study investigates the relevance of government quality in moderating the incidence of 
environmental degradation on inclusive human development in 44 sub-Saharan African 
countries for the period 2000-2012. Environmental degradation is measured with CO2 
emissions and the governance dynamics include: political stability, voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality, the rule of law and corruption-control. The 
empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments. Regulation quality 
modulates CO2 emissions to exert a net negative effect on inclusive development. 
Institutional governance (consisting of corruption-control and the rule of law) modulates CO2 
emissions to also exert a net negative effect on inclusive human development. Fortunately, the 
corresponding interactive effects are positive, which indicates that good governance needs to 
be enhanced to achieve positive net effects. A policy threshold of institutional governance at 
which institutional governance completely dampens the unfavourable effect of CO2 emissions 
on inclusive human development is established. Other policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
This research on the relevance of governance in moderating the effect of environmental 
degradation on inclusive human development, builds on four main factors in scholarly circles, 
notably: (i) the growing challenge (or policy syndrome) of economic growth because 
economic growth should be pro-poor in the post-2015 era in which shared economic 
prosperity is fundamental for the achievement of most Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs)2; (ii) issues surrounding the degradation of the environment, (iii) concerns of poor 
governance when it comes to addressing environmental degradation issues and (iv) gaps in the 
attendant literature.  
 First, as recently documented by Asongu and Odhiambo (2018a, 2019), inclusive 
human development is a central theme in SDGs.  This importance of inclusive development is 
even more crucial in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) because in spite of the sub-region achieving 
more than two decades of resurgence in economic growth, the population living in extreme 
poverty has been consistently increasing and hence, close to half of the countries in the sub-
region failed to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target of reducing extreme 
poverty by half (Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b). The nexus between poverty, economic growth 
and inclusive development can be understood from the perspective that the fruits of economic 
prosperity have not been trickling to the poor factions of the population (Fosu, 2015; Asongu 
& Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Asongu & le Roux, 2018). 
 The underlying policy syndrome of exclusive growth is an important policy issue 
because the objective of completely eradicating poverty in the sub-region by 2030 (i.e. in the 
light of the SDGs) is very less likely to be reached unless inclusive human development is 
fostered across SSA: “This paper examines its feasibility for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the 
world’s poorest but growing region. It finds that under plausible assumptions extreme poverty 
                                                          
2In the light of the extant literature, a policy syndrome is conceived and defined by Fosu (2013) to reflect 
conditions that are unfavourable for economic development, notably:  “administered redistribution”, “state 
breakdown”, “state controls”, and “suboptimal inter temporal resource allocation”.  Following Asongu (2017),  a 
policy syndrome denotes a gap in knowledge economy between two countries or fundamental characteristics of 
economic development. Consistent with recent inclusive development literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a; 
Tchamyou et al., 2019), a policy syndrome is a factor of exclusive development, notably: income inequality and 
the presence of growth that is not pro-poor.   
 
. 
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will not be eradicated in SSA by 2030, but it can be reduced to low levels through high 
growth and income redistribution towards the poor segments of the society” (Bicaba et al., 
2017, p. 93). In this study, we contribute to addressing the discussed concern of exclusive 
human development by assessing how governance is relevant in moderating the effect of 
environmental degradation on inclusive human development.  
Second, another important concern in the SDG agenda is the sustainability of the environment 
(Akpan et al., 2015; Mbah & Nzeadibe, 2016; Asongu et al., 2016;  Asongu et al., 2017). 
This concern in SSA is premised on at least three factors, notably: (i) the startling evidence of 
the energy crisis across the sub-region and (ii) consequences of global environmental 
degradation. These points are expanded in the same order as they are highlighted. (i) About 
two-thirds of the African population (i.e. approximately 620 million inhabitants) does not 
have access to "affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern electricity", which is crucial to 
achieve SDGs (Akinyemi et al., 2015; Shurig, 2015; Jarrett, 2017).  
(ii) As documented in recent literature, the ramifications of fossil fuel consumption would be 
most detrimental in SSA (Kifle, 2008; Huxster et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2017). This is 
essentially because, inter alia: carbon dioxide emissions (CO2) constitute about 75% of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the world (Akpan & Akpan, 2012; Asongu et al., 2018). 
Moreover, as maintained by Jarrett (2017), the unreliable supply of power is a principal 
hurdle for corporations in Africa. According to the author, about 30 countries on the continent 
experience regular blackouts and shortages which cost their economies approximately 
between 2 and 5% of GDP. In summary, the energy deficit on the continent continues to 
retard economic prosperity, agricultural transformation, job creation, education and 
improvement of health facilities. It is further acknowledged that in order to achieve SDGs, it 
is crucial for the leaders on the continent to improve governance standards, especially in 
relation to how policies can be tailored to increase socio-economic development by making 
energy access clean, reliable and affordable for all (Jarrett, 2017). The outcome variable of 
this study (i.e. inclusive human development) and policy variables (i.e. good governance 
dynamics) are consistent with the underlying narratives and recommendations.  
Third, good governance is important in understanding the energy crisis because decades of 
mismanagement and neglect in SSA have led to some of the worst functioning grid systems in 
the world. In essence, according to the attendant literature, not enough political will has been 
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garnered to effectively manage energy and environmental issues (Odhiambo, 2010; Afful-
Koomson, 2012; Apkan & Akpan, 2012; Hongwu, 2013; Jones, 2003; Chemutai, 2009; 
Odhiambo, 2014a, 2014a; Anyangwe, 2014; Akinyemi et al., 2015, 2018; Jarrett, 2017; 
Asongu et al., 2018; Asongu, 2018a; Efobi et al., 2018).  
Fourth, this study is positioned on assessing how good governance can modulate the effect of 
CO2 emissions on inclusive development because of an apparent gap in the literature. 
Accordingly, the attendant literature has largely focused on nexuses between economic 
development, environmental degradation and energy consumption. The first stream of this 
attendant literature has investigated the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis 
(Diao et al., 2009; Akbostanci et al., 2009; He & Richard, 2010)3. This stream therefore 
focuses on the nexus between environmental degradation and economic growth. The second 
stream has two main branches: (i) connections between the consumption of energy and 
environmental pollution (Jumbe, 2004; Ang, 2007; Apergis & Payne, 2009; Odhiambo, 
2009a, 2009b; Ozturk & Acaravci, 2010;  Menyah & Wolde-Rufael, 2010; Bölük & Mehmet, 
2015; Begum et al., 2015; Le Van & Chon, 2017; Cui et al., 2018; Rui et al., 2018)  and (ii)  
linkages between energy consumption and economic growth (see   Mehrara, 2007; Esso, 
2010)4.  
Noticeably, a common shortcoming in the engaged literature is the fact that providing nexuses 
between indicators of macroeconomic development are not enough to effectively inform 
policy makers. This research argues that such nexuses should be tailored such that they assess 
how policy variables moderate policy syndromes in order to affect targeted outcomes. In the 
light of the challenging policy imperative of inclusive development regarding SDG, this 
research extends the underlying literature by assessing how good governance modulates 
environmental degradation to affect inclusive human development in SSA. Hence, the 
corresponding research question is the following: how does good governance modulate the 
effect of environmental degradation on inclusive human development in SSA?   
 While the preceding paragraph has substantiated the connection between governance 
and environmental degradation, it is also worthwhile to articulate the nexus between 
                                                          
3According to the EKC, in the long run, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita income 
and environmental pollution. 
4
 Also see Olusegun (2008) and Akinlo (2008). 
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environmental pollution and inclusive human development. Therefore, in line with Asongu 
and Odhiambo (2018b), we argue that the degradation of the environment affects constituents 
of the inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI) used in this study as the outcome 
variables, notably: education, health and long life. First, environmental pollution can affect 
the income of a family by influencing the capacity of workers within a household to work 
effectively and search for jobs (Zivin & Neidell, 2012).  Second, it is reasonable to argue that 
the degradation of the environment directly influences parents’ ability to have their children 
go to school (Currie et al., 2009). This is more apparent in the presence of pollution in the 
atmosphere and lack of adequate facilities of transport. Furthermore, such pollution of the 
atmosphere can also influence the ability of students and pupils to study effectively in class 
(Clark et al., 2012; Sunyer et al., 2015). Third, still building from intuition, environmental 
pollution and degradation also affect healthy living and by extension, the life expectancy of 
the population (Boogaard et al., 2017; Rich, 2017).  
 Given that this study is motivated by SDGs, it is also relevant to discuss the linkages 
between inclusive development and sustainable development. According to Amavilahet al. 
(2017), inclusive development is related to sustainable development in the perspective that in 
order for inclusive development to be sustainable, it should be sustained and for sustained 
development to be sustainable, it must be inclusive.  This research is also positioned as a 
theory-building empirical study because applied econometrics is not exclusively based on the 
rejection and acceptance of existing theories. Hence, we are consistent with a recent strand of 
the literature in arguing that an empirical study motivated by sound intuition is a relevant 
scientific activity (Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a), especially in the 
light of challenges to SDGs.  
 The remainder of the study is organised as follows. The data and methodology are 
covered in Section 2 while Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes with 
implications and future research directions.  
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2 Data and methodology 
2.1 Data 
This research focuses on forty-four countries in SSA with data for the period 2000-20125. The 
data is from four main sources, notably: (i) the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) for the outcome variable (i.e. the inequality-adjusted human development index); (ii) 
the World Governance indicators of the World Bank for six governance indicators (political 
stability/no violence, voice and accountability, regulation quality, government effectiveness, 
corruption-control and the rule of law); (iii) the Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD) of the World Bank for a control variable (i.e. credit access) and (iv) the 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank for the policy syndrome variable (i.e. 
environmental degradation) and two control variables (i.e. education quality and foreign aid). 
The adopted periodicity and number of countries are contingent on the constraints in data 
availability at the time of the study.  
 In the light of the motivation of the study, the adopted outcome indicator is the 
inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI): the human development index (HDI) 
that is adjusted for the prevalence of inequality among the population. This indicator has been 
used in recent literature on environmental sustainability. In the light of the attendant literature,  
“The human development index (HDI) denotes a national mean of results in three principal 
dimensions, notably: health and long life, knowledge and basic living standards. The IHDI 
goes a step further by adjusting the HDI to prevalent levels of inequality in the 
aforementioned three dimensions. In other words, the IHDI also takes into consideration the 
manner in which the three underlying achievements are distributed within the population” 
(Asongu et al., 2017, p. 355). 
 CO2 emission per capita is used to measure environmental pollution or the policy 
syndrome, in line with recent environmental degradation literature (Asongu, 2018b). The 
policy variables are six main governance indicators highlighted above. These indicators which 
                                                          
5The 44 countries are: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic. Republic., Congo Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
8 
 
are from Kaufmann et al. (2010), are increasingly being used in African governance literature 
(Andres et al.,2015; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; Efobi, 2015; Oluwatobi et al., 2015; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b; Pelizzo et al., 2016; Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016, 2018; 
Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2018). According to the attendant literature: “The first concept is about 
the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced (Political Governance): 
voice and accountability and political stability. The second has to do with the capacity of 
government to formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services (Economic 
Governance): regulatory quality and government effectiveness. The last, but by no means 
least, regards the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the interactions 
among them (Institutional Governance): rule of law and control of corruption” (Andres et al., 
2015, p. 1041). 
 Consistent with recent inclusive human development literature (Asongu&Odhiambo, 
2018b), three main control variables are used to account for variable omission bias, namely: 
education quality, credit access and foreign aid. Foreign aid and education quality are 
anticipated to reduce inclusive human development whereas credit access is anticipated to 
have the opposite incidence. Using the same indicator of inclusive human development, 
Asongu (2014) has established that development assistance has a negative incidence on the 
outcome variable. Conversely, financial access has been documented to be an instrument of 
inclusive development (Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Meniago & Asongu, 2018). 
The education quality indicator is the pupil-teacher ratio such that an increasing ratio is 
associated with poor education quality because more pupils have to be accommodated by a 
smaller teaching staff. Hence, in terms of measurement, the indicator appreciates poor 
education quality. This primary education indicator is preferred to higher levels of education 
because it has been documented to be more associated with socio-economic development 
when economies are at initial stages of industrialisation (Asiedu, 2014; Petrakis & Stamakis, 
2002; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018a). The expected negative sign from poor education quality 
is consistent with the established positive nexus between education and inclusive development 
(Dunlap-Hinkler et al., 2010). Furthermore, education is a component of the IHDI.  
 It is important to note that the motivation for limiting indicators of the conditioning 
information set to three variables (in order to avoid concerns of instrument proliferation) is 
consistent with the attendant empirical literature based on Generalised Method of Moments 
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(GMM) that has used a zero control variable (Osabuohien & Efobi, 2013; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017c) or less than three control variables (Bruno et al., 2012). The definitions 
and sources of the variables are provided in Appendix 1 while the summary statistics are 
disclosed in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 presents the correlation matrix.  
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 GMM: Specification, identification and exclusion restrictions  
 Consistent with the underlying literature, the adoption of the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) as an empirical strategy is motivated by four main factors (Tchamyou, 
2019a, 2019b). First, the primary condition of having the number of cross sections exceed the 
number of periods within each cross section is fulfilled because the study is dealing with 44 
countries over a span of 11 years (i.e. from 2004 to 2014). Second, the outcome variable is 
persistent because its correlation with its first lag is greater than 0.800, which is the rule of 
thumb for establishing persistence in a variable (Tchamyou et al., 2019). Third, cross-country 
differences are taken on board given the panel nature of the dataset. Fourth, endogeneity is 
addressed because: (i) simultaneity or reverse causality are tackled with an instrumentation 
process and (ii) time invariant variables are used to account for the unobserved heterogeneity. 
 The research adopts the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) extension of Arellano and Bover 
(1995) essentially because it has been established in the attendant literature to limit the 
proliferation of instruments (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; Tchamyou et al., 2019; Boateng 
et al., 2018).  
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard system 
GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiHD , is the human development  variable of  country i in  period t , 0 is a constant,
CO  represents CO2 emissions,  G  entails governance   (political stability, voice & 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law and corruption-
control), COG  denotes an interaction between a CO2 emission variable and a governance 
dynamic (“political stability” × “CO2 emissions”, “voice & accountability” × “CO2 
emissions”, “government effectiveness” × “CO2 emissions”, “regulation quality” × “CO2 
emissions”, “corruption-control” × “CO2 emissions”, and   “rule of law” × “CO2 emissions”),   
W  is the vector of control variables (education quality, credit access and foreign aid),
represents the coefficient of auto-regression which is one within the framework of this study 
because a year lag is enough to capture past information, t is the time-specific constant, i is 
the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 
2.2.2Identification and exclusion restrictions 
 In order to ensure robustness in the estimation approach, it is worthwhile to articulate 
identification and exclusion restrictions that are paramount for a tight GMM specification. In 
line with contemporary empirical literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c; Tchamyou & 
Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018; Tchamyou et al., 2019), the identification strategy is 
such that the time invariant variables are considered as strictly exogenous whereas the 
endogenous explaining variables are defined as predetermined. This strategy of identification 
is supported by Roodman (2009b) who has argued that it is not feasible for time invariant 
indicators to be first-differenced endogenous6.   
 In the light of the identification framework, the assumption of exclusion restriction is 
confirmed if the null hypothesis corresponding to the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
instrument exogeneity is not rejected. The null hypothesis is the position that the identified 
strictly exogenous variables elucidate the outcome variable exclusively via the predetermined 
variables. This process is not dissimilar to the standard procedure of employing classic 
instruments in which, the null hypothesis corresponding to the Sargan test should not be 
rejected in order for selected instruments to be valid (Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016d). 
                                                          
6Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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3. Presentation of results 
3.1 Empirical results  
 The empirical results are disclosed in this section in Table 1. The findings are 
presented in three main groups pertaining to indicators of political governance(consisting of 
political stability and “voice & accountability”), economic governance(entailing government 
effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional governance (encompassing corruption-
control and the rule of law), respectively. Each of the governance dynamic entails two 
indicators of governance, in the light of definitions and classifications provided in the data 
section. Four main criteria are used to investigate the post-estimation validity of the GMM 
findings7. In the light of these criteria, the models on government effectiveness and 
corruption-control do not pass all post-estimation diagnostic tests because the null hypothesis 
of the Hansen test is rejected. This null hypothesis is the position that instruments are valid. It 
is relevant to note that the Hansen test is robust but weakened by instrument proliferation, 
whereas the Sargan test is not robust but not weakened by instrument proliferation. Hence, a 
measure of dealing with the conflicting criteria is to adopt the Hansen test and control for 
instrument proliferation by ensuring that in each specification, the number of cross sections is 
higher than the number of instruments. This approach is adopted for the study. 
 In order to assess research question or the overall effect of government quality in 
modulating the effect of CO2 emissions on inclusive human development, net effects are 
computed from the unconditional effect of CO2 emissions on inclusive human development 
and the corresponding conditional effect from the interaction between CO2 emissions and 
government quality dynamics. For instance, in the fourth column of Table 1, in the 
regressions pertaining to regulation quality, the net effect of regulation quality in moderating 
the effect of CO2 emissions on inclusive human development is -0.0028 ([0.013× -0.604] + 
[0.005]). In the computation, -0.604 is the mean value of regulation quality; the unconditional 
effect of CO2emissions per capita is 0.005, whereas the conditional impact from the 
                                                          
7
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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interaction between CO2 emissions per capita and regulation quality,  is 0.013. This approach 
to establishing an overall incidence based on net effects is consistent with contemporary 
interactive regressions literature (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Agoba et al., 2019). 
Table 1: Governance, CO2 emissions and Inclusive Development 
       
 Dependent variable:  Inclusive Human Development  
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
    
 Political Voice & Regulation Government Rule of Corruption- 
 Stability Accountability Quality Effectiveness Law Control 
       
Inclusive Development (IHDI)(-1) 0.949*** 0.957*** 0.921*** 0.906*** 0.943*** 0.954*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CO2 emissions (CO2) -0.002 -0.005*   0.005* 0.0001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.311) (0.050) (0.064) (0.953) (0.631) (0.764) 
Political Stability (PS) 0.002 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.347)      
Voice & Accountability (VA) --- 0.008*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.009)     
Regulation Quality (RQ) --- --- -0.020*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Government Effectiveness (GE) --- --- --- -0.001 --- --- 
    (0.720)   
Rule of Law (RL) --- --- --- --- -0.007 --- 
     (0.189)  
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- --- --- --- -0.010** 
      (0.037) 
PS × CO2 -0.0004 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.865)      
VA × CO2 --- -0.006 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.162)     
RQ × CO2 --- --- 0.013*** --- --- --- 
   (0.001)    
GE × CO2 --- --- --- -0.003 --- --- 
    (0.491)   
RL × CO2 --- --- --- --- 0.010* --- 
     (0.090)  
CC × CO2 --- --- --- --- --- 0.008** 
      (0.033) 
Education   -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003** -0.0004*** -0.0002**   -0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.023) (0.004) 
Private Domestic Credit 0.000005 0.0002** -0.00004 0.0003** -0.0001 -0.00006 
 (0.957) (0.043) (0.639) (0.021) (0.248) (0.558) 
Foreign Aid -0.00003 -0.00007** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.00004 -0.00005** 
 (0.188) (0.035) (0.000) (0.001) (0.116) (0.041) 
       
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net effects na na -0.0028 na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.128) (0.131) (0.109) (0.126) (0.179) (0.075) 
AR(2) (0.749) (0.971) (0.946) (0.657) (0.843) (0.644) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hansen OIR (0.158) (0.131) (0.110) (0.070) (0.219) (0.091) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.129) (0.027) (0.100) (0.047) (0.135) (0.081) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.234) (0.375) (0.185) (0.172) (0.314) (0.170) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.045) (0.060) (0.281) (0.154) (0.121) (0.034) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.583) (0.428) (0.106) (0.110) (0.455) (0.434) 
       
Fisher  55862.15*** 1.15e+06*** 38200.76*** 33699.51*** 20430.30***   1.82e+06*** 
Instruments  36 36 36 36 36 36 
Countries  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations  217 217 217 217 217 217 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
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coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)and 
AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed 
for the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions.   The following are the mean values of 
governance variables: -0.486 (political stability); -0.543 (voice & accountability); -0.697 (government effectiveness); -0.604 (regulation 
quality); -0.663 (rule of law) and -0.590 (corruption-control). Constants are included in the regressions.  
The main finding in Table 1 is that regulation quality modulates CO2 emissions to exert a net 
negative effect on inclusive development. Net effects pertaining to the other governance 
dynamics cannot be computed because either the model does not pass post-estimation 
diagnostics tests or at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects 
is not significant. The significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 
3.2 Robustness checks  
 In order to assess whether the established findings in Table 1 withstand further 
empirical scrutiny, the six governance indicators are bundled into four other governance 
dynamics, notably: political governance (consisting of political stability and voice & 
accountability), economic governance (entailing government effectiveness and regulation 
quality), institutional governance (represented with the rule of law and corruption-control) 
and general governance (i.e. encompassing political, economic and institutional dynamics of 
governance). The approach used for the retention of common factors is the Kaiser (1974) and 
Jolliffe (2002) criterion for the selection of principal components in principal component 
analysis. According to the criterion, only principal components with an eigenvalue greater 
than the mean should be retained (Asongu et al., 2019). This criterion is adopted in the 
retention of composite governance indicators in this study. The approach to bundling 
governance variables for robustness purposes by means of principal component analysis is 
consistent with recent literature (Tchamyou, 2017; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018c).  
  In Table 2, results pertaining to economic governance and general governance do not 
pass post-estimation diagnostic tests because the null hypothesis of the Hansen test is rejected. 
The main finding from the table is a net negative effect from the role of institutional 
governance in modulating the effect of CO2 emissions on inclusive human development. The 
significant control variables have the expected signs.  
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Table 2: Robustness checks 
     
 Dependent variable:  Inclusive Human Development 
     
 Political Economic Institutional General  
 Governance Governance Governance Governance 
     
Inclusive Development (IHDI)(-1) 0.952*** 0.913*** 0.968*** 0.896*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CO2 emissions (CO2) -0.0007 -0.007 -0.013**   -0.002 
 (0.775) (0.127) (0.019) (0.633) 
Political Governance (Polgov) 0.003* --- --- --- 
 (0.061)    
Economic Governance  (Ecogov) --- -0.004** --- --- 
  (0.035)   
Institutional Governance  (Instgov) --- --- -0.004* --- 
   (0.061)  
General Governance  (Ggov) --- --- --- -0.0001 
    (0.903) 
Polgov × CO2 -0.002 --- --- --- 
 (0.210)    
Ecogov × CO2 --- 0.004 --- --- 
  (0.135)   
Instgov × CO2 --- --- 0.005*** --- 
   (0.007)  
Ggov × CO2 --- --- --- 0.0006 
    (0.707) 
Education   -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) 
PrivateDomesticCredit 0.00009 0.00008 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.364) (0.627) (0.126) (0.332) 
ForeignAid -0.00003 -0.0001*** 0.000002 -0.0001*** 
 (0.283) (0.001) (0.126) (0.002) 
     
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Net effects na na -0.0122 na 
     
AR(1) (0.105) (0.185) (0.170) (0.271) 
AR(2) (0.941) (0.959) (0.683) (0.666) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.141) (0.088) (0.212) (0.093) 
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group (0.058) (0.078) (0.076) (0.050) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.296) (0.169) (0.382) (0.217) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group (0.137) (0.256) (0.223) (0.237) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.267) (0.090) (0.287) (0.103) 
     
Fisher  1.41e+06*** 8.08e+06*** 16775.73*** 8159.59** 
Instruments  36 36 36 36 
Countries  37 37 37 37 
Observations  217 217 217 217 
     
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)and 
AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed 
for the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions.  The following are the mean values of 
governance variables: 0.140 (political governance); 0.205 (economic governance); 0.144 (institutional governance) and 0.284 (general 
governance). Constants are included in the regressions. 
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4. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 This study has investigated the relevance of government quality in moderating the 
incidence of environmental degradation on inclusive human development in 44 sub-Saharan 
African countries for the period 2000-2012. Environmental degradation is measured with 
CO2 emissions while the governance dynamics include: political stability, voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulation quality, the rule of law and corruption-
control. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments. The 
following main findings are established. First, regulation quality modulates CO2 emissions to 
exert a net negative effect on inclusive development. Second, when the six governance 
indicators are bundled by means of principal component analysis for robustness checks, 
institutional governance (consisting of corruption-control and the rule of law) modulates CO2 
emissions to also exert a net negative effect on inclusive human development.  
While this net effect pertaining to regulation quality is negative, it is worthwhile to emphasise 
that both the conditional and unconditional effects are positive. Hence, the negative net effect 
is largely traceable to the fact that the average value of regulation quality for the sample 
countries is negative. In other words, the fact that regulation quality is negatively skewed 
implies that regulation quality needs to be further improved in order for net positive effects to 
be achieved.  As a policy implication, enhancing regulation quality is essential for the 
government dynamic to effectively modulate CO2 emissions for the expected positive net 
effects on inclusive human development  
It is also worthwhile to note that the conditional effect pertaining to institutional governance 
is positive, which implies that enhancing institutional governance modulates the unconditional 
negative effect of CO2 emissions on inclusive human development. Moreover, a threshold of 
institutional governance at which the conditional positive effect completely dampens the 
unconditional negative effect is 2.6 (0.013/0.005). This threshold makes economic sense and 
it feasible from a policy perspective because the maximum limit of institutional governance 
disclosed in the summary statistics is 3.766.  Hence, at a critical mass of 2.6, the net effect of 
institutional governance in modulating the effect of CO2 emissions on inclusive development 
is zero: 0 ([0.005× 2.6] + [-0.013]).  As a policy implication, a level of institutional 
governance beyond the established 2.6 threshold ensures that institutional governance 
completely modulates the unfavourable effect of CO2 emissions on inclusive human 
development. Above the threshold, positive net effects are apparent.  
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 The findings broadly show that there is a need for greater action in the governance 
dynamics from which significant findings could not be established. Such greater action is also 
relevant for governance dynamics that significantly modulate the effect of CO2 emissions on 
inclusive human development.  
Future studies can employ appropriate estimation techniques for country-specific studies in 
order to assess if the established findings withstand empirical scrutiny from country-oriented 
frameworks.  This recommendation for country-specific studies builds on the caveat that 
country-specific studies are not considered in the GMM approach. Accordingly, country-
specific effects are eliminated by first-differencing in order to avoid inherent concerns of 
endogeneity linked to the correlation between the lagged inclusive human development 
indicator and country-specific effects.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurements) Sources 
    
CO2 per capita CO2mtpc CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Political Stability 
PolS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
 
 
  
Voice & 
Accountability 
VA “Voice and accountability (estimate): measure the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Political Governance Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
GE “Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Regulation Quality RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Economic 
Governance 
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
 
 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
 
Corruption-Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WGI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance 
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
 
   
General Governance Ggov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances   
PCA 
    
Inclusive 
Development 
IHDI Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index  UNDP 
    
Educational Quality Educ Pupil teacher ratio in Primary Education  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Credit Access   Credit Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid NODA Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  WGI: World Governance Indicators. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. 
UNDP: United Nations Development Program.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2000-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
CO2 per capita 0.911 1.842 0.016 10.093 532 
Political Stability  -0.486 0.923 -2.660 1.192 496 
Voice & Accountability  -0.543 0.687 -1.838 0.986 496 
Political Governance  0.140 1.230 -2.653 2.583 496 
Government Effectiveness  -0.697 0.584 -1.960 0.934 496 
Regulation Quality  -0.604 0.542 -2.110 0.983 496 
Economic Governance   0.205 1.225 -2.288 3.807 496 
Rule of Law -0.663 0.614 -2.113 1.056 496 
Corruption-Control -0.590 0.565 -1.566 1.249 496 
Institutional Governance   0.144 1.282 -2.391 3.766 496 
General Governance  0.284 2.040 -4.567 5.561 496 
Inclusive Development  0.450 0.110 0.219 0.768 431 
Educational Quality  43.892 14.775 12.466 100.236 397 
Private Domestic Credit  19.142 23.278 0.550 149.78 458 
Foreign Aid 11.944 14.712 -0.253 181.187 531 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 269) 
                
 Governance Dynamics Control variables  Dep. 
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance      Variable 
 PolS VA Polgov CO2mtpc RQ Ecogov RL CC Instgov G.gov Educ Credit NODA CO2mtpc IHDI 
PolS 1.000               
VA 0.712 1.000              
Polgov 0.929 0.920 1.000             
GE 0.688 0.805 0.805 1.000            
RQ 0.674 0.755 0.771 0.894 1.000           
Ecogov 0.700 0.803 0.811 0.976 0.969 1.000          
RL 0.805 0.835 0.886 0.890 0.872 0.912 1.000         
CC 0.715 0.722 0.777 0.854 0.822 0.862 0.868 1.000        
Instgov 0.786 0.806 0.860 0.908 0.877 0.918 0.967 0.966 1.000       
G.gov 0.841 0.884 0.931 0.942 0.916 0.955 0.968 0.912 0.973 1.000      
Educ -0.286 -0.30 -0.319 -0.422 -0.37 -0.410 -0.38 -0.39 -0.400 -0.396 1.000     
Credit 0.335 0.489 0.443 0.573 0.561 0.583 0.517 0.522 0.538 0.548 -0.42 1.000    
NODA -0.113 -0.02 -0.074 -0.212 -0.26 -0.243 -0.14 -0.17 -0.166 -0.168 0.139 -0.16 1.000   
CO2mtpc 0.356 0.388 0.402 0.557 0.419 0.506 0.454 0.517 0.502 0.493 -0.46 0.711 -0.230 1.000  
IHDI 0.456 0.393 0.460 0.606 0.524 0.583 0.550 0.550 0.569 0.565 -0.54 0.559 -0.388 0.650 1.000 
                
PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation 
Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Corruption-Control. Instgov: Institutional Governance. Ggov: General 
Governance. Educ: Education quality. Credit: Private Domestic credit. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance.  CO2mtpc: CO2 
emissions per capita. IHDI: Inclusive human development. 
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